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Case Note
CIVIL PROCEDURE—Wyoming Governmental Claims Act: Back to
the Future; Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011)
Anne K. Kugler*
Introduction
For nearly the last thirty years, Wyoming citizens have been consistently
kicked out of the court system in the context of government claims, for inadvertent
mistakes in pleading, thanks to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s judicially created
pleading requirements in 1983.1 Following this line of precedent, in Brown v.
City of Casper, the District Court dismissed Robert Brown’s claim because he
inadvertently failed to attach a Notice of Claim to the Complaint, even though
he did in fact present the Notice to the City of Casper, as required by Wyoming
Government Claims Act.2 Brown appealed, hoping that the Wyoming Supreme
Court would recognize that the injuries he sustained when a Casper Police
Officer ran a red light and collided with Brown’s vehicle, were more important
than the simple error he committed in failing to attach his Notice of Claim to
his Complaint.3
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court overruled twenty-eight years
of precedent when it held that if a claimant satisfies the conditions precedent
pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), district courts
have jurisdiction to allow a claimant to amend their governmental claim to
allege compliance with the WGCA and the Wyoming Constitution.4 For the
previous twenty-eight years, district courts were deprived of jurisdiction over
WGCA lawsuits if a claimant failed to allege in its complaint that it presented a
governmental entity with a notice that it was initiating suit.5 In 1983, the Wyoming

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2013. I would like to thank my family,
Professor Jerry R. Parkinson, Kyle Ridgeway, Jared Miller, and the rest of the Wyoming Law Review
Editorial Board for their guidance and support. I would especially like to thank the attorneys at
Williams, Porter, Day & Neville for introducing me to this case.
1
Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Wyo. v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 415 (Wyo. 1983), overruled by Brown v.
City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011).
2

Brown, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Wyo. 2011).

Am. Claim Under Wyoming Governmental Claims Act at 2, Brown, 248 P.3d 1136
(No. S-09-0263).
3

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1147–48 (holding that in cases where a notice of claim has been
properly presented, district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to allow claimants to amend
their complaint to so allege).
4

Bell, 662 P.2d at 415 (concluding district courts are deprived of jurisdiction over
governmental claims if a claimant “fails to allege the filing of the claim pursuant to [the WGCA]”).
5
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Supreme Court created this heightened pleading requirement in Board of Trustees
of University of Wyoming v. Bell.6 No statute, constitutional provision, or case law
required this heightened requirement.7 In Brown, the Wyoming Supreme Court
overruled Bell, recognizing district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over governmental claims,8 and courts are not at liberty to create pleading rules
restricting jurisdiction that the constitution granted to district courts.9
This case note argues that Brown corrects a flaw in Wyoming jurisprudence
that stood for nearly thirty years and wrongly deprived district courts of
jurisdiction over governmental claims.10 This note first discusses the law before
Board of Trustees of University of Wyoming v. Bell.11 Then this note demonstrates
how the Wyoming Supreme Court misinterpreted the statute in Bell.12 This
note then explains why the court was justified in overturning Bell in spite of
the doctrine of stare decisis.13 Finally, this note emphasizes the positive impact
Brown is likely to have on Wyomingites who suffer harm as a result of unlawful
government action.14

6
Id. In Brown, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that Bell had been
misinterpreted because claimant’s notice of claim was never at issue. Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139. The
court stated:

Bell has mistakenly been interpreted to mean that courts have no power to act in
a case against a governmental entity unless the complaint alleges presentation of a
notice of claim. Contrary to that interpretation, Bell had to have meant dismissal was
appropriate in that case because it did not appear the condition precedent to suit had
been met.
Id. at 1140.
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1143 (reviewing the law at the time Bell was decided and concluding
there was no requirement under Wyoming law that presentation of notice of claim had to be alleged
in the complaint); see infra notes 40–47 and accompanying text (discussing cases decided before
Bell that allowed claimants to amend complaints that failed to allege compliance with the statutory
requirements of the WGCA).
7

8
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139. Brown relied on section 1-39-117 of the Wyoming Statutes,
which states in pertinent part “[o]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim filed in state court
under this act shall be in the district courts of Wyoming.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-117 (2011);
see also Wyo. Const. art. V, § 10 (“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes
both at law and in equity . . . and of such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise
provided for.”).
9
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139. Brown relied on section 5-2-115 of the Wyoming Statutes for the
proposition that rules governing pleading and procedure “shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify
the substantive rights of any person nor the jurisdiction of any of the courts . . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 5-2-115 (2011).
10

See infra notes 15–214 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.

12

See infra notes 48–90 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 145–95 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 196–207 and accompanying text.
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Background
The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act
As a general matter, the government is immune to suit.15 The purpose of the
WGCA is to provide a limited waiver of immunity and thus permit recovery from
governmental entities for injuries received from the government’s exercise of its
authority.16 The WGCA encompasses sections 1-39-101 through 1-39-121 of the
Wyoming Statutes and controls governmental claims.17 The Wyoming Legislature
adopted the WGCA in 1979 “to balance the respective equities between persons
injured by governmental actions and the taxpayers of the state of Wyoming . . . .”18
However, the legislature created conditions precedent that must be satisfied in
order for an entity to bring suit against the government.19
Specifically, the WGCA requires claimants to present a notice of claim to the
governmental entity that the claim is against.20 A notice of claim is an itemized
statement, separate from the actual complaint.21 The notice of claim must state
the time, place, and circumstances of the alleged injury; the name and address
of the claimant; the claimant’s representative or attorney; and the amount of
compensation or other relief demanded.22 A notice of claim must be presented
within two years of the alleged injury.23 Once a notice of claim is presented, a
complaint may be filed stating generally that the notice of claim was filed in
accordance with the requirements of the WGCA.24 This complaint must also be

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104 (2011) (stating that except as provided in the WGCA, a
governmental entity is granted immunity from liability for any tort).
15

Id. § 1-39-102 (recognizing the possible unfairness resulting in the government’s sovereign
immunity and thus allowing a limited waiver of this immunity).
16

17

Id. §§ 1-39-101 to -121 (establishing the statutory provisions that are part of the WGCA).

Id. § 1-39-102 (discussing the purpose of the WGCA); Lawrence J. Wolfe, Wyoming’s
Government Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity With Exceptions—A Statutory Analysis, 15 Land &
Water L. Rev. 619, 619 (1980) (recognizing that the WGCA was enacted in 1979 to balance the
equities between persons injured by government actors and the taxpayers).
18

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (requiring a notice of claim be presented to the governmental
entity in which the suit is against, in the form of an itemized statement within two years of the
alleged act).
19

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

Id. (“[I]n any action under this act, the complaint shall state . . . [t]hat the claim . . . was
filed in accordance with this section.”).
24
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filed within two years from the date of the alleged act.25 Finally, Wyoming district
courts exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over governmental claims
pursuant to the WGCA.26

Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Pleading Requirements
The Wyoming Supreme Court has defined subject matter jurisdiction as “‘the
power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings
in question belong.’”27 Jurisdiction is essential for a court to exercise its power
over a case or controversy.28 Wyoming district courts are courts of superior and
general jurisdiction and exercise authority over all subject matters.29 A district
court’s jurisdiction is not dependent upon the sufficiency of the pleadings, the
validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, the plaintiff ’s right to the
relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings, or the correctness of the
decision rendered.30
Article five, section ten of the Wyoming Constitution states district courts shall
have original jurisdiction over all cases in law and equity.31 A court’s jurisdictional
powers are either impliedly or explicitly conferred on it by the constitution or
legislature.32 Generally, a court with jurisdiction over a case has not only the right,
but also the duty to exercise that jurisdiction.33
The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure state that each averment of a
pleading shall be simple, concise, direct, and that no technical forms of pleading
or motions are required.34 A party may amend its pleading by leave of the court
25

Id. (establishing the time limitations of the WGCA).

26

Id. § 1-39-117 (stating district courts have exclusive jurisdiction under this Act).

Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 902–03 (Wyo. 1977) (quoting Booth v. Magee Carpet Co.,
548 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo. 1976)).
27

28
21 C.J.S. Courts § 20 (2011) (“[J]urisdiction of the subject matter is essential to the deter
mination of every case.”).
29
Urbach v. Urbach, 73 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo. 1937) (stating district courts are courts of
superior and general jurisdiction and administer over suits in common law, statutory law, and
principles of equity).
30

Id. (explaining Wyoming district courts’ jurisdictional authority).

Wyo. Const. art. V, §10 (“The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all causes
both at law and in equity and in all criminal cases, of all matters of probate and insolvency and of
such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for.”).
31

32
20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 58 (2011) (“A court possesses only such jurisdictional powers
as are directly, or indirectly, expressly or by implication, conferred on it by the constitution or
legislation of the sovereignty on behalf of which it functions.”).
33
Buckman v. United Mine Workers of Am., 339 P.2d 398, 400 (Wyo. 1959) (“If that
complaint stated a cause of action, then and in that event the court acquired jurisdiction and the
power and the duty to decide the case.”); see 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 58 (2011).
34

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (requiring a pleading to be concise and direct).
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and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.35 The Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure state that when pleading a condition precedent, “it is sufficient
to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed or have
occurred.”36 Additionally, motions to dismiss should only be granted when a
party fails to plead the operative facts that would place the opposing party on
notice.37 Moreover, when considering a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in
the complaint are admitted and the allegations must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party.38

Wyoming Law Before Bell
Initially, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the broad jurisdictional
authority of Wyoming district courts over governmental claims prior to the
enactment of the WGCA.39 In State v. Kusel the Wyoming Supreme Court held
deficient information in a complaint against the government does not deprive
district courts of jurisdiction.40 The court went on to state in Kusel that facts
essential to invoke jurisdiction are different from those needed to state a cause
of action.41 In Houtz v. Board of Commissioners of Uinta County, the claimant

35

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (allowing for amendments of pleadings when justice so requires).

36

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 9(c).

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 8(a)–(b); Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 608 P.2d
1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1980). In Johnson, the court stated:
37

Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure are based upon the theory of notice pleading. The
plaintiff need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation so as to give fair
notice of the claim to the defendant . . . . [P]leadings must be liberally construed in
order to do justice to the parties and motions to dismiss must be sparingly granted.
Id. (citations omitted).
38
Baessle v. Freir, 258 P.3d 720, 723 (Wyo. 2011) (recognizing when reviewing a motion to
dismiss the court will accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, view them in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and dismissal is appropriate only if the complaint is clear on its
face that the plaintiff does not assert any facts that create entitlement to relief (citing Swinney v.
Jones, 199 P.3d 512, 515 (Wyo.2008)).

Price v. State Highway Comm’n, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (Wyo. 1946) (noting that despite the
failure of the plaintiff to present a notice of claim, the district court clearly had jurisdiction over
the dispute); Utah Constr. Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 19 P.2d 951, 953 (Wyo. 1933) (stating
even though the claimant failed to provide notice to the county, jurisdiction over the claim resided
with the district court); Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheridan Cnty. v. Denebrink, 89 P. 7, 10 (Wyo. 1907)
(upholding an action brought in district court asserting malpractice against a county hospital);
Houtz v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Uinta Cnty., 70 P. 840, 843 (Wyo. 1902) (recognizing when a plaintiff
seeks recovery from the county its claim must be heard in district court).
39

213 P. 367, 369 (Wyo. 1923) (“[I]n order to enable a court of general jurisdiction to
proceed in the cause in its earlier stages, it is not essential . . . that the information or complaint
before it be perfect or state a cause of action.”).
40

Id. (“‘The cause of action may be defectively stated, but that does not destroy jurisdiction.’”
(quoting O’Brien v. People, 75 N.E. 108 (Ill. 1905))).
41
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failed to allege his notice of claim was properly presented in his complaint as
required by the constitution.42 However, the district court exercised jurisdiction
and allowed claimant to amend his complaint to be in compliance with the
Wyoming Constitution’s requirement to present a notice of claim.43 Even though
the Wyoming Supreme Court ultimately found claimant failed to provide
actual notice to the government, this defect did not deprive the district court
of jurisdiction.44
Before Bell, when the condition precedent requiring presentation of a notice
of claim was inadequately pleaded in a complaint, district courts had the discretion
to allow litigants to amend their complaints to properly allege that a condition
precedent was met.45 Prior to 1983, Wyoming courts recognized a notice of claim
had to be presented before an action could be brought against a governmental
entity, however courts did not require that a complaint allege presentation of a
notice of claim before suit could be brought against a governmental entity.46 It was
not until Bell that district courts were deprived of jurisdiction when a claimant
failed to allege a presentation of notice of claim.47

Judicially Created Pleading Requirements and Bell
In Bell, Rosemarie Bell brought an action against the University of Wyoming
claiming slander, harassing conduct, and threats of termination forced her
resignation.48 Because the issue was never raised by the parties, the district court
42

70 P. 840, 842 (Wyo. 1902).

43

Id.

Id. (holding that the plaintiff had no right to recover from the county without previously
presenting his claim to the board of county commissioners, however, this defect did not affect the
district court’s jurisdiction).
44

See, e.g., Matter of Larsen, 770 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Wyo. 1989) (stating the district court
has subject matter jurisdiction despite failures to comply with statutory requirements); State ex. rel.
Yohe v. Dist. Ct. of Eighth Judicial Dist., 238 P. 545, 548 (Wyo. 1925) (holding the district court
is a court of superior and general jurisdiction, and there can be no question that it had jurisdiction
over the governmental claim); Houtz, 70 P. at 842 (allowing the district court to exercise jurisdiction
over a deficient governmental claim).
45

Bd. of Comm’rs of Sheridan Cnty. v. Denebrink, 89 P. 7, 10 (Wyo. 1907) (finding that
even though the notice of claim was not attached to the complaint, the missing attachment did
not contain the necessary allegations of the complaint and therefore the action was not dismissed);
Houtz, 70 P. at 844 (finding after review of the facts the complaint did comply not with the
constitutional and statutory requirements, however this defect did not prevent the district court
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction).
46

47
Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 415 (Wyo. 1983), overruled by Brown
v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011). In Dee v. Laramie County, the Wyoming Supreme
Court relied solely on Bell in holding that a failure to allege compliance with the notice of claim
requirement in the complaint deprives the district court of jurisdiction. 666 P.2d 957, 959 (Wyo.
1983), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; see infra note 53 (listing cases that have relied on Bell and
its progeny).
48

662 P.2d at 415.
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did not determine if notice was properly presented to the University.49 The
University failed to reply to Bell’s complaint and a default judgment was entered
against the University.50
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held “even though [the WGCA]
is not explicit with respect to whether the filing of a claim is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit[,] . . . failure to file a claim under [the WGCA] results in a
district court having no jurisdiction . . . .”51 The court determined Bell’s complaint
was defective because it failed to allege that she presented a notice of claim to the
University and this defect deprived the district court of jurisdiction.52

Effect of Bell
For the next twenty-eight years, Wyoming courts interpreted Bell to mean
that when a governmental claim failed to allege compliance with the WGCA in its
complaint, district courts were deprived of jurisdiction.53 Courts’ strict adherence
to the pleading requirements created in Bell produced some unfortunate
consequences.54 In McCann v. City of Cody a waterline broke in the course of a
construction project at the behest of the City.55 Water from the broken line backed
49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

Id. at 414 (“We can only conclude that in the absence of an allegation of the filing of such
a claim the district court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action . . . .”).
52

53
Churchill v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 234 P.3d 365, 366 (Wyo. 2010) (upholding the
dismissal of a complaint for failure to allege compliance with constitutional requirements), overruled
by Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136 (Wyo. 2011); Uptown Café, Inc. v. Town of Greybull,
231 P.3d 257, 257–58 (Wyo. 2010) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint for failure to allege
compliance with the constitution), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; McCann v. City of Cody,
210 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Wyo. 2009) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint for failing to allege
compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirements), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136;
Motley v. Platte Cnty., 220 P.3d 518, 519–20 (Wyo. 2009) (upholding dismissal of a complaint
for failure to allege compliance with the constitution), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Gose v.
City of Douglas, 193 P.3d 1159, 1164 (Wyo. 2008) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint for
failing to allege compliance with constitutional requirements even though the notice of claim was
in compliance), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Garnett v. Brock, 2 P.3d 558, 563 (Wyo. 2000)
(dismissing the complaint because it did not allege presentation of a notice of claim), overruled
by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230–31 (Wyo. 1996) (dismissing the
complaint because no notice of claim was presented), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Boyd v.
Nation, 909 P.2d 323, 326 (Wyo. 1996) (dismissing the complaint because it did not allege the date
of the notice of claim was presented), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Amrein v. Wyo. Livestock
Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo. 1993) (dismissing the complaint for failure to allege the date that
notice of the claim was presented), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136; Dee v. Laramie Cnty., 666
P.2d 957, 958 (Wyo. 1983) (dismissing a governmental claim for failure to allege presentation of a
notice of claim), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136.
54

See infra notes 55–77 and accompanying text.

55

210 P.3d at 1079, overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136.
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up onto the roadway and instantly froze.56 When McCann came across the street
there was no signage or other warning devices to make her aware of the hazard.57
The icy conditions caused McCann’s car to flip, both totaling the car and causing
her significant personal injuries.58 McCann presented a timely notice of claim to
the City, but she failed to allege compliance with statutory requirements in her
complaint.59 Because of this failure, the district court dismissed her complaint and
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal.60 Despite suffering serious
injuries, McCann received no compensation and never had her day in court.61
The court applied this heightened pleading requirement in subsequent cases
and continued to apply the notice of claim requirements strictly.62 For example,
in Beaulieu v. Florquist (Beaulieu II ), the court further applied Bell to even more
technical defects involving the notice of claim.63 Bruce Florquist, in the course
of his employment by the city of Rawlins, struck the Beaulieu’s family vehicle
while it was properly stopped at a stop sign.64 Beaulieu, her unborn child, and
her daughter were all injured in the accident.65 Applying Bell’s rationale, the court
dismissed the plaintiff ’s complaint because it did not allege that the notice of claim
met the signature and certification requirements of the Wyoming Constitution,
thus depriving the court of its jurisdiction simply because the complaint was
not pleaded correctly.66 Just as it had in Bell, the court in Beaulieu II failed to
consider the practical consequences of its decision, and Beaulieu was denied her
day in court.67
In Churchill v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital, Ashlie Churchill was
injured while awakening from a tonsillectomy and adenotonsillectomy.68 In a
two-page decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court relied on Beaulieu II and stated
even though Churchill’s complaint “indicate[d] compliance with the statutory
notice of claim requirements, the complaint [did] not allege that Ms. Churchill
56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 1082.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

See infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.

86 P.3d 863, 867 (Wyo. 2004), overruled by Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136
(Wyo. 2011).
63

Beaulieu v. Florquist (Beaulieu I), 20 P.3d 521, 524 (Wyo. 2001) (reversing summary
judgment based on a statute of limitations issue and remanding for further proceedings).
64

65

Id.

Beaulieu II, 86 P.3d at 872 (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the complaint’s
failure to adequately plead compliance with the WGCA).
66

67

Id.

68

234 P.3d 365, 365 (Wyo. 2010), overruled by Brown, 248 P.3d 1136.
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complied with the signature and certification requirements . . . .”69 Once again,
the court allowed technical deficiencies involving the notice of claim to deprive the
district court of jurisdiction.70 These are just a fraction of Wyoming cases dismissed
because of failure to comply with judicially created pleading requirements.71
The State of Wyoming, in responding to governmental claims during the
Bell era, used the technicalities of pleading requirements to consistently dismiss
claims.72 In Lavati v. State, the State waited until the day after the two-year
statute of limitations expired to file a motion for summary judgment alleging
the plaintiff ’s claim was deficient.73 Lavati, did in fact fail to comply with the
signature requirements pursuant to the WGCA, and the Wyoming Supreme
Court upheld the district court’s summary judgment and dismissed the case.74
Justice Kite, in her concurring opinion, stated the State’s “calculated effort” to
delay the claimant’s recognition of his technical error “resulted in a win for the
State, but at what cost?”75 Justice Kite explained the handling of a lawsuit is not
a game, and that there is an “absolute duty of candor and fairness.”76 Justice Kite
recognized the State’s actions did not demonstrate the high standard of candor,
honesty, and good faith required by the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
of professional conduct, and precedent.77

A Different Approach
Other courts reject Bell’s rationale, claiming such reasoning is contrary to
the rules of civil procedure and other government claims acts.78 Federal courts
do not require technical forms of pleading when determining whether subject
matter jurisdiction has been properly pleaded.79 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
69
Id. at 366. Churchill alleged that she presented a notice of claim, but did not allege that the
notice of claim was signed under penalty of perjury. Id. The lack of such allegation, even though her
notice was in fact signed, kept her out of court. Id.
70

Id.

See supra note 53 (discussing cases that dismissed governmental claims in adherence to Bell
and its progeny).
71

72

See infra text and accompanying notes 73–77.

73

Lavati v. State, 121 P.3d 121, 123 (Wyo. 2005).

74

Id. at 125 (Kite, J., concurring).

75

Id. at 125–26 (quoting Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98, 100–02 (Wyo. 1984)).

Id. at 126; see also Kath, 684 P.2d at 100–01 (recognizing the duty of candor, fairness, and
honesty in litigating a lawsuit).
76

77

Lavati, 121 P.3d at 126.

78

See infra notes 79–99 and accompanying text.

Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1206 (3d ed. 2011)
(“[T]he district court may sustain jurisdiction when an examination of the entire complaint reveals
a proper basis for assuming subject matter jurisdiction other than one that has been improperly
asserted by the pleader or otherwise demonstrates that jurisdiction exists when the Rule 8(a)(1)
allegation is defective in some regard. In some cases federal courts have excused the nonexistence
79
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15(a)(2) allows courts to freely grant leave to cure a defective statement of juris
diction.80 Some courts will even sustain jurisdiction if an examination of the
entire complaint reveals a proper basis for assuming subject matter jurisdiction.81
Likewise, despite a failure to properly plead a case under the Federal Tort Claims
Act constituting grounds for dismissal, federal district courts do not apply pleading
requirements stringently.82
The United States Supreme Court allows a claimant to amend its government
claim unless it prejudices the adverse party.83 Additionally, many state courts
also take a more lenient approach to the pleading requirements in regard to
governmental claims.84 The Oklahoma Supreme Court permits a claimant to
amend its complaint in order to comply with statutory requirements of the
Governmental Tort Claims Act 85 and only requires substantial compliance, rather
than strict compliance.86 The New Mexico Supreme Court permits amendments to
a claimant’s complaint against the government even after the applicable limitation
period has run, as long as all parties are on notice of the claim and the facts from
which it arose.87 Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that factual
defects in the notice of claim will not bar a governmental claim so long as the claim
gives general notice of intent to sue.88 The Colorado Supreme Court emphasizes
of a jurisdictional allegation or an insufficient allegation when information outside the complaint
demonstrates the actual existence of the court’s jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); see also Mountain
Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[A] motion to dismiss an
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied even though the allegation of jurisdiction
is insufficient or entirely lacking if there are facts pleaded in the complaint from which jurisdiction
may be inferred in essence and effect.”); Massachusetts v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 122
(1st Cir. 1976) (determining although jurisdiction was plead improperly, an examination of the
entire complaint reveals jurisdiction is proper).
80

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 (a)(2); see also Wright et al., supra note 79, at § 1206.

81

See supra note 79.

82
Drakatos v. R. B. Denison, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 942, 946 (D. Conn. 1980) (allowing claimant,
who improperly alleged jurisdiction under the FTCA, to amend her complaint).
83
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (reasoning that in the absence of undue delay,
bad faith, or undue prejudice to the opposing party, leave to amend a complaint should be freely
granted, and an outright denial to grant amendment without justification is an abuse of discretion
by district courts and is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
84

See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.

Calvert v. Tulsa Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa Cnty., 932 P.2d 1087, 1090–91
(Okla. 1996), superseded on other grounds by statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 156(D) (1992) (allowing
amendments under the Governmental Tort Claims Act).
85

86

Id.

Chavez v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M., 711 P.2d 883, 887–88 (N.M. 1985) (permitting
amendments to a complaint brought under New Mexico’s governmental claims act after the time
period had expired).
87

88
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); cf. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 412 P.2d 449, 450 (Utah
1966) (finding the city received a sufficient notice of claim, even though claimant failed to satisfy
statutory requirements).
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the necessity of going beyond the pleadings to determine if a condition precedent
is actually met, and remands complaints in order to determine whether a notice of
claim was timely filed.89 Finally, the Nebraska Supreme Court adamantly defends
the subject matter jurisdiction constitutionally conferred on the district courts,
and has held that the legislature cannot limit or take from the courts their broad
and general jurisdiction.90

Stare Decisis
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”91 Stare decisis is the
doctrine of precedent, in which courts must follow earlier binding judicial
decisions when the same facts are at issue.92 The doctrine of stare decisis furthers
“the ‘evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process.’”93 As Justice Cardozo stated, precedent is adhered
to because, “it will not do to decide the same question one way between one set
of litigants and the opposite way between another.”94
However, stare decisis is not an “inexorable command.”95 The United
States Supreme Court outlined when precedent should be overruled in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.96 In Casey, the Court held that
when abandoning precedent, courts should be “informed by a series of prudential
and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a
prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs
of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”97 The Court determined precedent
Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 927 (Col. 1993)
(stating that on remand, the trial court should conduct such further proceedings as necessary
to determine whether Trinity gave timely notice to Westminster under the Governmental
Immunity Act).
89

90
Arant v. G.H., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 631, 635 (Neb. 1988); State ex rel. Wright v. Barney, 276
N.W. 676, 680 (Neb. 1937); State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bank of Minatare, 242 N.W. 278, 281
(Neb. 1932) (holding that in the context of governmental claims, it is an imperative duty of the
courts to protect their jurisdiction granted to them by the Constitution).
91

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).

92

Black’s Law Dictionary 672 (9th ed. 2009).

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1146 (Wyo. 2011) (citations omitted) (quoting
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wyo.1999)).
93

B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1st ed. 1921). The Supreme
Court has stated that stare decisis ensures “the law will not merely change erratically” and “permits
society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
94

95
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212
(1984); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–11 (1932).
96

505 U.S. at 854.

97

Id.
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should be overruled when: an earlier rule has become unworkable, there is
minimal societal reliance on the rule, the rule is without doctrinal support, or
society’s perceptions of the facts have so changed that there is no longer a factual
foundation for the original decision.98 If any of these circumstances exist, the
doctrine of stare decisis may be abandoned.99

2010 Amendments to WGCA
While Brown was being decided, the legislature amended the WGCA,
effective July 1, 2010.100 Before these amendments, the WGCA lacked specific
pleading requirements; instead, all requirements under the WGCA were judicially
created.101 These amendments introduced language that seemingly heightened
the pleading requirements of the WGCA, possibly conflicting with the Brown
decision.102 Realizing this potential confusion, Brown acknowledged these
amendments, and stated that claimants are required to comply with the statutory
requirements.103 However, Brown allowed district courts to freely grant parties
leave to amend their complaints to comply with these statutory requirements.104

98

Id. To determine whether precedent should be abandoned the Court stated:
[W]e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend
a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification.

Id. at 854–55 (citations omitted).
99
100

Id.
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (2011) (containing the 2010 amendments).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (1982) (lacking any specific pleading requirements until
the 2010 amendments); see also Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Wyo. v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 415 (Wyo. 1983)
(creating pleadings requirements in which claimants must abide by in order to bring a claim against
the government under the WGCA).
101

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 n.4 (Wyo. 2011). The 2010 amendment,
effective July 1, 2010, added subparts (c)(i) through (c)(v) and (d) through (e) to section 1-39-113
of the Wyoming Statutes. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (2011).
102

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139 n.4 (recognizing the 2010 amendments do not, nor have the
provisions ever, address the courts’ jurisdiction over claims under the WGCA, thus, the amendments
do not affect the outcome of Brown).
103

104

Id. at 1139. The court stated:
We continue to require that complaints alleging claims against governmental entities
must also allege compliance with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing
notices of claim. However, we clarify that in cases where a notice of claim has been
properly presented but the complaint fails to allege that fact, district courts have the
discretion to allow amendment of the complaint to cure the failure.

Id. (citations omitted).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol12/iss1/6

12

Kugler: Civil Procedure - Wyoming Governmental Claims Act: Back to the Fu

2012

Case Note

127

Principal Case
On April 28, 2007, Robert K. Brown entered an intersection traveling
northbound at about twenty-five miles per hour.105 The traffic signal at the
intersection was green for northbound traffic.106 As Brown entered the intersection,
Officer Walters of the Casper Police Department entered the intersection against
a red light and hit Brown’s vehicle.107 Brown claimed Officer Walters was traveling
sixty-three miles per hour and did not have his lights flashing or his siren turned
on.108 Brown’s car was totaled and he suffered physical injuries resulting in
$22,741.75 in medical bills.109
Brown presented a Notice of Claim to the City of Casper within one year of
the collision in compliance with the WGCA.110 Within two years of the collision,
Brown presented an amended Notice of Claim, detailing the damages he sustained
in the collision.111 On April 23, 2009 and within two years of the collision, Brown
filed a complaint against the City in district court.112 His Complaint alleged “all
requirements of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act . . . have been complied
with, and a claim in conformity therewith was served upon the City of Casper.
. . .”113 Brown, however, inadvertently failed to attach the Notice of Claim to
his Complaint.114
The City of Casper, in its Answer, asserted an affirmative defense claiming
Brown had not met the requirements of the WGCA.115 Specifically, the City
claimed that because the Notice of Claim was not attached to Brown’s Complaint,
there was no proof the Claim had been signed and certified in accordance with
requirements of the WGCA and the Wyoming Constitution.116 On July 16,

Am. Claim Under Wyoming Governmental Claims Act at 2, Brown, 248 P.3d 1136 (No.
S-09-0263).
105

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1138.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 1138–39.

Id. at 1138. The City of Casper was mainly arguing Brown had failed to comply with
the signature and certification requirements set forth both in the WGCA and the Wyoming
Constitution. Id. at 1139. This requirement was addressed in Baeulieu II and Churchill, on which
the district court in Brown relied. Id. Casper and the district court claimed Brown’s Complaint failed
to allege that he complied with the Wyoming Constitution, which states:
116

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 12 [2012], No. 1, Art. 6

128

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 12

2009, the City filed a motion for judgment as matter of law claiming the district
court lacked jurisdiction because of Brown’s defective Complaint.117 The next day,
Brown filed a motion to amend his Complaint, so that he could allege compliance
with the Wyoming Constitution.118

The District Court’s Decision
Relying on Bell and its progeny, the district court determined that Brown’s
Complaint did not confer jurisdiction upon it, and granted summary judgment
in favor of the City.119 Specifically, the district court held it lacked jurisdiction
because Brown failed to allege compliance with the constitutional requirements
necessary to bring an action against the government.120

Wyoming Supreme Court’s Majority Decision
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Kite, joined by Justices Golden, Hill,
and Burke, recognized that Bell was binding precedent, but acknowledged that
precedent should be abandoned when it is necessary “‘to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’”121 The court reasoned stare
decisis should not be adhered to when prior decisions are “‘poorly reasoned’”
and the doctrine does “‘not require automatic conformance to past decisions.’”122
Relying on these principles, the court departed from precedent, and held the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Brown’s action.123 Because
No money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by
law and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or
demands against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be audited,
allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified to under penalty
of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose duty it may be to audit
the same.
Wyo. Const., art. 16, § 7.
117

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139.

118

Id.

119

Id. The district court’s order stated:
[Mr. Brown]’s complaint fails to contain an allegation that he complied with the
Wyoming Constitution and, therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under Wyoming Supreme Court precedent. . . . Without subject matter jurisdiction,
the Court FURTHER FINDS it lacks any authority to grant [Mr. Brown]’s motion
to amend his Complaint. . . . The only action the Court can take is to deny [Mr.
Brown]’s motion to amend his Complaint . . . .

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting the district court’s order).
120

Id. at 1138; supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining the district court’s holding).

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1146 (citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp.
Div. v. Barker, 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wyo. 1999)).
121

122

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Barker, 978 P.2d at 1161).

123

Id. at 1147.
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Brown actually presented the State with a notice of claim, and his Complaint
inadvertently failed to attach his Notice of Claim to the Complaint, the district
court had discretion to allow Brown to amend his Complaint and cure the
defect.124 The majority recognized that subject matter jurisdiction is invoked with
the filing of a timely complaint stating a cause of action against the government.125
The court went on to state that a litigant’s failure to allege compliance with the
WGCA’s requirements does not and cannot affect the district court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.126 This effectively overruled Bell and its progeny.127

Justice Golden’s Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Golden, the senior member of the court,
conceded the court’s prior decisions involving the WGCA had been untenable.128
Justice Golden described these decisions by quoting: “‘I can only say that I am
amazed that a man of my intelligence should have been guilty of giving such an
opinion.’”129 Justice Golden admitted claims against the government now appear
in a different light, and the Wyoming Supreme Court has shown ignorance in its
handling of such issues.130
Justice Golden relied on the requirements of the Wyoming and Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to support the majority’s holding.131 He recognized that
under the rules of civil procedure and the WGCA, a complaint only needs to
be a short plain statement of the court’s jurisdictional grounds, with simple and
concise claims for relief, and technical pleading forms are not required.132 Further,
a claimant needs only state generally that all conditions precedent have been
124

Id. at 1149 (Golden, J., concurring).

125

Id.

126

Id.

Id. at 1146–47. The court explained that district courts have jurisdiction over governmental
claims even when a claimant fails to allege compliance with the WGCA, and that district courts may
allow amendments of complaints to comply with the WGCA. Id. (“To the extent that Bell and its
progeny held otherwise, those decisions are overruled.”).
127

128

Id. at 1149 (Golden, J., concurring).

129

Id. (quoting McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950)).

Id. Justice Golden quoted Justice Robert Jackson: “The matter does not appear to me now
as it appears to have appeared to me then . . . . My own error, however, can furnish no ground for
its being adopted by this Court. . . . Ignorance, sir, ignorance.” Id. at 1149 (quoting McGrath v.
Kristensen, 340 U.S. at 178) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130

131

Id. at 1148–50.

132

Id. Justice Golden set forth the pleadings requirements of the rules of civil procedure:
[A] short and plain statement of the court’s jurisdictional grounds; each averment of
a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct and not technical forms of pleading
are required; all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice; and it is
sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed.

Id. at 1149.
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met.133 Requiring anything more under the WGCA, Justice Golden argued, is
contrary to purpose of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.134

The Dissent
Justice Voigt dissented. He contended the Wyoming Supreme Court had
consistently held for twenty-eight years district courts do not have jurisdiction over
governmental claims absent sufficient allegations of compliance with procedural
requirements in the complaint.135 Justice Voigt reasoned the WGCA requires
litigants to satisfy several conditions precedent in order to bring suit against the
government.136 Failure to satisfy such requirements prevents the district courts
from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction.137 Justice Voigt feared claimants
would not necessarily be forced to comply with the WGCA if claimants are not
required to allege compliance with the WGCA.138 Moreover, the WGCA provides
a limited waiver of the government’s sovereign immunity; therefore the legislature
could have not granted the district court jurisdiction over all cases simply alleging
a claim against a governmental entity, rather, only over claims that properly allege
compliance the WGCA.139

Analysis
Until Bell, neither the Wyoming Constitution nor precedent suggested district
courts were deprived of subject matter jurisdiction over a defective governmental
claim.140 In the context of governmental claims, the Wyoming Supreme Court has
traditionally held that a party seeking to bring an action against a governmental

133

Id.; see Wyo. R. Civ. P. 9(c) (setting forth pleading requirements for condition precedents).

134

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1149 (Golden, J., concurring).

135

Id. at 1150 (Voigt, J., dissenting).

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. Justice Voigt claimed:
[I]f . . . a plaintiff fails to allege compliance with the statute and constitution, and
the defending government entity follows up that failure with a failure of its own to
raise the issue, it is waived and the district court can proceed to adjudicate the claim,
whether or not . . . any procedural requirements were met.

Id.
139
Id. (“The nature of the WGCA, with immunity being the rule and liability the exception,
convinces me that . . . the legislature did not grant the district courts jurisdiction over all cases
alleging a claim against a governmental entity, but only over those cases alleging claims made ‘under
[the] act.’ For that reason, I believe that making one’s claim under the act is jurisdictional.” (quoting
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (2010)).
140
See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (discussing cases leading up to Bell that
sustained district courts’ jurisdiction over defectively pleaded WGCA claims).
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entity must comply with the notice of claim requirement of the WGCA.141 This
requirement, however, was not meant to prevent the district from exercising
jurisdiction to determine if the claimant substantially complied with WGCA’s
notice requirements.142 Before Bell, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that
a district court’s jurisdiction did not depend on the allegations in the pleading or
the sufficiency of the complaint.143 Brown corrected the perversion created by Bell
in holding that a district court’s jurisdiction cannot be destroyed over a deficiently
pleaded governmental claim.144

Abandoning Precedent
The Wyoming Constitution states: “All courts shall be open and every
person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have justice
administered without sale, denial or delay.”145 Over the last thirty years, victims
suffered serious injuries at the hand of government employees.146 Despite having
meritorious claims, these victims were denied justice by the courts because of their
reliance on Bell and its progeny.147
In Brown, the court recognized that the cases relying on Bell had continued
in an unsustainable direction, suffering from lack of authority, and ultimately
creating an unsupportable legal proposition.148 The dissent insisted courts should
141
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1140–43; see supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (reviewing case
law prior to Bell).
142
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1142; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (1977 & Cum.Supp. 1982)
(prior to 2010 amendments) (requiring only that a claimant provide a governmental entity a notice
of claim before initiating suit).
143
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1140–43; see In re Plymouth Cordage Co., 135 F.1000, 1004 (8th Cir.
1905); supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text. The Plymouth court stated:

The facts essential to invoke jurisdiction differ materially from those essential to
constitute a good cause of action for the relief sought. . . . [A]n insufficient complaint
at law, accompanied by proper service upon the defendants, gives jurisdiction to the
court to determine the questions it presents, although it may not contain averments
which entitle the complainant to any relief; and it may be the duty of the court to
determine either the question of its jurisdiction or the merits of the controversy against
the petitioner or plaintiff. Allegations indispensable to a favorable adjudication . . . are
not requisite to the jurisdiction of the suit or proceeding.
Id.
144
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1147–48; see also 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 58 (2011) (“[I]t is well settled
that jurisdiction does not depend upon the sufficiency of the bill . . . . The cause of action may be
defectively stated, but that does not destroy jurisdiction.”).
145

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 8.

See supra notes 48–77 and accompanying text (discussing specific instances that an
individual was injured because of unlawful action by a government employee, however was never
compensated because of claimant’s failure to allege compliance with the WGCA in the complaint).
146

147

Id.

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1144–46 (“In subsequent cases relying on Bell, this Court continued in
[an] unsustainable direction.”).
148
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respect the doctrine of stare decisis and adhere to precedent.149 The majority
recognized precedent “‘contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process’”150 and “furthers the ‘evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles . . . .’”151 However, the majority explained that
courts should not be compelled to follow flawed precedent simply because of
blind adherence to stare decisis.152 The United States Supreme Court is instructive
on the issue of when to abandon precedent in Wyoming, because where federal
law is analogous to state law Wyoming has looked to the federal courts to aid
in its decisions.153 The United States Supreme Court outlined when precedent
should be overruled in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.154
According to Casey, precedent should be overruled when an earlier rule has
become unworkable, when there is minimal societal reliance on the rule, the rule
is without doctrinal support, or society’s perceptions of the facts have so changed
that there is no longer a factual foundation for the original decision.155 Applying
the Casey factors to the Brown decision, it becomes evident that the Wyoming
Supreme Court was correct in abandoning twenty-eight years of precedent.156
149
Id. at 1150 (Voigt, J., dissenting) (arguing for the last twenty-eight years the Wyoming
Supreme Court had consistently held a claimant’s failure to allege compliance the WGCA deprived
district courts of jurisdiction).
150

Id. at 1146 (majority opinion) (quoting Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992)).

151

Id. (quoting Cook, 841 P.2d at 1353).

152

Id.

Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 Land & Water
L. Rev. 527, 550 (1986) (stating that where federal law is analogous, Wyoming has looked to
federal courts to aid in interpreting the state law); see, e.g., State v. Naple, 143 P.3d 358, 362 (Wyo.
2006) (stating that where the text of a state rule is substantially similar to that of a federal rule,
interpretations of the federal rule are instructive to the Wyoming Supreme Court).
153

154
505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992); see Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of
Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1173, 1194 (2006) (“Discussing stare decisis today without mentioning
Casey is like presenting Hamlet without Hamlet—or, some might say, Harry Potter without the
evil Voldemort.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court, Stare Decisis, and Overruling
the Overrulings, 55 Wayne L. Rev. 1911, 1915 (2009) (recognizing that the Casey factors are the
foremost pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court as to when precedent should be
abandoned, and provide guidance to other courts in that regard); see also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2001) (reiterating that the Casey factors
are the current test for overruling precedent).
155
Casey, 505 U.S. at 854; see Montejo v. Louisiana, 129. S. Ct. 2079, 2088–89 (2009)
(“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare
decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether
the decision was well reasoned.”); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 131 (2011) (“[T]he ‘stare decisis’ doctrine
counsels that a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and
inescapable logic require it.”); see also supra note 98 (outlining the test set forth in Casey).
156
See Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 Am.
J. Comp. L. 67, 82 (2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States has felt particularly free to
overrule its own constitutional precedents when . . . they concern procedural and evidentiary rules
rather than property rights or contracts.”); see also infra text accompanying notes 157–95 (applying
the test set forth in Casey to the facts in Brown).
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Practical Workability
The first factor outlined in Casey is whether the rule has become unworkable.157
Precedent should be abandoned when “consequences to litigants and courts
alike from the perpetuation of an unworkable rule are too great.”158 The policy
implications behind allowing litigants to simply amend their complaint when the
individual has provided actual notice to the governmental entity far outweigh a
dismissal of their case based on a judicially created pleading requirement.159 The
purpose of the WGCA is to provide compensation to individuals who have been
injured by the government.160 Strict application of a judicially created pleading
requirement prevented the WGCA from serving its purpose.161 For some time
now, certain justices of the Wyoming Supreme Court realized the rule created in
Bell was defeating the purpose of the WGCA and therefore was unworkable.162

157

Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.

Swift & Co. v. Wickman, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); see Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis As
Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 411, 423 (2010) (“Unworkable rules are clumsy and
unpredictable, creating needless costs and diluting the benefits of a stable society governed by the
rule of law.”).
158

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1139 (Wyo. 2011). The injustices caused by the
court’s reliance on Bell in cases such as McCann v. City of Cody, support this proposition. 210 P.3d
1078, 1080 (Wyo. 2009). Further, in Brown the court recognized Bell might not have intended to
create the judicial pleadings requirements courts interpreted Bell to create. Brown, 248 P.3d at 1139;
see also Kozel, supra note 158, at 425 (stating “[t]here is no way to know in the abstract without
investigating the specific facts and circumstances surrounding a precedent” whether precedent
should be overturned).
159

160
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102 (2011) (stating the purpose of the WGCA is to compensate
those injured by government employees); Wolfe, supra note 18 at 619 (recognizing the WGCA
was enacted in 1979 to balance the equities between persons injured by government actors and
the taxpayers).
161
See supra notes 53–77 and accompanying text (discussing the governmental claims that
were dismissed because of courts’ reliance on Bell, despite actual compliance with the WGCA
requirements in fact).

McCann, 210 P.3d at 1086 (Burke, J., dissenting) (arguing the judicially created pleading
requirements are not required by the WGCA and if the rules mandate dismissal they should be
abolished and claimants should be allowed to amend their complaints); Lavati v. Wyoming, 121
P.3d 121, 125–26 (Wyo. 2005) (Kite, J., concurring) (criticizing the gamesmanship of the State
in using the pleading requirements to systematically dismiss legitimate WGCA claims); Amrein v.
Wyo. Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 772–72 (Wyo. 1993) (Urbikit, J., dissenting) (stating a claimant
is denied due process and access to the courts when his governmental claim is dismissed simply
because of inadequate allegations in his complaint); see also Sellers, supra note 156, at 83–84 (stating
that courts consider whether precedents have been subject to “substantial and continuing” criticism
in determining whether to abandon stare decisis and create a new rule).
162
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Societal Reliance
The second factor of the Casey test requires an evaluation of society’s reliance
on the rule to determine if overruling precedent will cause special hardships.163
As Justice Cardozo recognized, the inverse determination of whether adherence
to precedent would create an injustice is also relevant; and if so, the court should
depart from that precedent.164 The court’s adherence to Bell, and reliance on its
principles, caused countless injustices and placed special hardships on society,
ultimately depriving victims of their constitutionally protected rights.165 More
specifically, the court’s reliance on Bell caused special hardships and injustices in
cases such as McCann v. City of Cody, Bealieu II, and Churchill v. Campbell County
Memorial Hospital.166 In these cases, individuals, at no fault of their own, were
seriously injured by government officials.167 A technically inadequate pleading,
however, prevented them from obtaining compensation for those injuries.168
Alarmingly, the State used these judicially created pleading requirements as a
tactic to dismiss cases.169 The State abandoned the legal standards required by the
Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct, and
precedent requiring candor and honesty in order to take advantage of a judicially
created loophole.170 Thus, by overturning precedent such as this, the court could
eliminate these hardships.171

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1992); see also
Sellers, supra note 156, at 79 (stating that one of the Casey factors is whether changing a rule relied
on by society would create special hardships).
163

164
Cardozo, supra note 94, at 150; see Christopher P. Banks, Reversals of Precedent and Judicial
Policy-Making: How Judicial Conceptions of Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influence Social
Change, 32 Akron L. Rev. 233, 236 (1999) (recognizing Justice Cardozo as a highly regarded jurist
on stare decisis).

Churchill v. Campbell Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 234 P.3d 365 (Wyo. 2010); McCann, 210 P.3d
at 1082; Beaulieu II, 86 P.3d 863, 872 (Wyo. 2004); see supra notes 53–77 and accompanying text
(discussing governmental claims that were dismissed in adherence to Bell and its progeny).
165

Churchill, 234 P.3d at passim; McCann, 201 P.3d at passim; Beaulieu II, 86 P.3d at passim;
see supra text accompanying notes 53–71.
166

Churchill, 234 P.3d at passim; McCann, 201 P.3d at passim; Beaulieu II, 86 P.3d at passim;
see supra text accompanying notes 53–71.
167

168
Churchill, 234 P.3d at passim; McCann, 201 P.3d at passim; Beaulieu II, 86 P.3d at passim;
see supra text accompanying notes 53–71.
169
Lavati v. Wyoming, 121 P.3d 121, 123 (Wyo. 2005) (“[T]he State willfully withheld
the information about its defense from Mr. Lavatai, in hopes the two-year period under the
Governmental Claims Act would expire before he realized his mistake.”).
170
Id. at 126 (noting the State’s lack of candor, honesty, and good faith in the handling of the
lawsuit); see also Kath v. Western Media, Inc., 684 P.2d 98, 100–01 (Wyo. 1984) (explaining an
attorney’s affirmative ethical standard to litigate in good faith).

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1147 (Wyo. 2011). By overruling Bell, the district
court gained authority to exercise its discretion and allow Brown to amend his Complaint. Id. This
enabled Brown to proceed with his claim, instead of being dismissed on technicalities. Id.
171
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As the court realized in Brown, “the [c]ourt seems to have confused
the principle . . . that a notice of claim is a condition precedent to suing the
government with the pleading requirement the court created in Bell.”172 Further,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has long elevated substance over form.173 In 1917,
the court held “judgments are to be liberally construed, and with more regard to
substance than to form.”174 Bell seemingly departed from this reasoning, implying
the form of the complaint was more important than the substance.175 However,
the court in Brown returned to the principles of recognizing meritorious claims
despite technical pleading defects, which cured the injustices caused by reliance
on Bell.176

Current Principles of Law
The third Casey factor is whether the evolution of the law has left a prior rule
without doctrinal support.177 The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure have been
amended over time, addressing conditions precedent and requiring plaintiffs to
generally aver that all conditions precedent are met.178 The purpose of these rules
is to “prevent dismissals of meritorious cases if the plaintiff fails specifically to
plead occurrence of conditions precedent.”179 The court has also held plaintiffs
only need plead the operative facts of the litigation so that the defendants have
fair notice of the claim.180 Therefore, Bell and its progeny failed to adhere to the

172

Id. at 1145.

173

Garber v. Spray, 164 P. 840, 842 (Wyo. 1917). The Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
Strict formality and accuracy are not required of pleadings in such courts, and mere
technical defects are to be disregarded . . . the general rule is that in such courts it
is only necessary that the pleadings shall clearly apprise the opposite party of the
grounds relied on to support or defeat the action, and that the petition or complaint
shall contain enough of substance to inform the defendant of the nature of plaintiff ’s
claim, and be so explicit that a judgment thereon will bar another suit for the same
cause of action.

Id.
174

Id. at 843.

Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Wyo. v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 412 (Wyo. 1983) (dismissing a claim
based on the form of the complaint rather than the substance of the claim), overruled by Brown, 248
P.3d 1136.
175

Brown, 248 P.3d at 1147–48 (holding deficient allegations in a complaint do not prevent a
district court from exercising jurisdiction over a governmental claim).
176

177

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).

178

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 9(c) (discussing general pleading requirements).

179

Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 608 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Wyo. 1980).

180
Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980)
(reiterating the specificity standard is satisfied when the pleadings give fair notice to the opposing
party); Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 (Wyo. 1979) (stating complaint should be construed
liberally to do substantial justice and the claim should only be specific enough to put the opposing
part on fair notice).
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policies of the rules of civil procedure by failing to liberally construe pleadings,
and the rule in Bell was without doctrinal support.181
Further, other courts have recognized that reasoning, like that in Bell, has little
credibility in the midst of current legal principles.182 The United States Supreme
Court has reasoned, in the context of governmental claims, it is entirely contrary
to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that mere technicalities prevent
a decision on the merits of the claim.183 Moreover, district courts abuse their
discretion when they refuse to grant a claimant leave to amend the complaint in
the absence of bad faith or undue prejudice.184 Wyoming looks to federal courts
as persuasive authority where they interpret statutes and language similar to
Wyoming law, and thus the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s
interpretations of the FTCA are persuasive regarding the ability to amend a
complaint, and Wyoming should therefore look to Tenth Circuit precedent in
interpreting its own statute.185 The FTCA’s language is similar to the WGCA’s.186
The Tenth Circuit has stated even if the allegation of jurisdiction is insufficient or
lacking, so long as there are facts pleaded in the complaint from which jurisdiction
may be inferred, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be
denied.187 As such, if the State is provided a notice of claim, simple failure to allege
statutory compliance would not interfere with the ultimate purpose of the notice
requirement.188 When faced with a motion to dismiss a governmental claim, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated the requirements of governmental claims “must
181
See supra notes 48–77 and accompanying text (discussing governmental claims that were
dismissed because of technical pleading defects).
182

See infra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181–82 (1962) (“In the absence of . . . undue delay, bad
faith or . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . the leave sought should, as the rules require,
be ‘freely given.’”); Wright et al., supra note 79, at § 1206 (stating that federal courts freely grant
leave to parties to amend their complaints).
183

184

Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.

See, e.g., Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 226 P.3d
809, 813 (Wyo. 2010) (recognizing that where the Wyoming air quality protections were drafted
with the intent to be at least as stringent as the federal regulations, the federal regulations and
coinciding precedent is persuasive authority in Wyoming); State v. Naple, 143 P.3d 358, 362 (Wyo.
2006) (stating that where the text of a state rule is substantially similar to that of a federal rule,
interpretations of the federal rule are instructive to the Wyoming Supreme Court).
185

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (2011) (requiring that a notice of claim was presented to the
relevant federal agency prior to suit), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 (2011) (requiring that a
notice of claim be presented to the relevant state entity prior to suit).
186

187
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[A] motion
to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction will be denied even though the allegation
of jurisdiction is insufficient or entirely lacking if there are facts pleaded in the complaint from
which jurisdiction may be inferred in essence and effect.”).
188
Wright et al., supra note 79, at § 3658 (stating the purpose of the notice requirement
under the FTCA is to “give the governmental agency enough notice of the nature and basis of the
claim so that it can begin its own investigation and evaluation . . .”).
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not be construed to defeat its purpose of permitting recovery from governmental
entities . . . .”189 Other state and federal courts do not apply Bell’s reasoning, and
therefore, Bell has almost no doctrinal support.190 In the light of other courts’
approaches to governmental claims, it is clear Brown was correct in overruling
Bell, as the legal principles enunciated in Bell are no longer, and likely never
were, valid.191

Inapplicability
The fourth and final Casey factor is whether facts have so changed that there
is no longer a foundation for the original decision.192 Although strict adherence
to pleading technicalities is no longer necessary in light of current WGCA
amendments, this factor of the test is not applicable.193 The injustices resulting
from courts’ reliance on Bell alone justify the court in overruling Bell and its
progeny.194 Therefore, it is clear the court’s logic and reasoning in Brown was
correct in abandoning precedent, as three of the four factors of the Casey test are
easily met.195

One Giant Leap for the Supreme Court, One Small Step for the WGCA
In Brown, the Wyoming Supreme Court took a huge step in the right direction
in clearing up confusion related to the WGCA.196 The WGCA, however, is still

Calvert v. Tulsa Pub. Sch., 932 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Okla. 1996) (citing Walker v. City of
Moore, 836 P.2d 1289 (Okla.1992)), superseded on other grounds by statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 51,
§ 156(D) (1992) (allowing amendments under the Governmental Tort Claims Act).
189

See supra 182–89 and accompanying text (discussing how other courts approach govern
mental claims).
190

191

See supra 182–90 and accompanying text.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (noting that
although some of the factual assumptions about neonatal care in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1972),
had changed, the issue as to when life begins medically was still unresolved, and thus the factual
premise of Roe’s central holding was intact, and the case could not be overturned).
192

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1136–50 (Wyo. 2011). There is nothing in Brown
that suggests the court overruled Bell because facts today are different than they once were. Id.
193

See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning the separate but
equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), because it had been shown that the
doctrine created injustices); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398, (1937) (overturning
the doctrine of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), by holding that legislatures could not
regulate labor standards because of the injustices created during the Great Depression). In the
context of Bell and its progeny, similar injustices have occurred. See supra text accompanying notes
48–77 (discussing governmental claims that were dismissed, even though meritorious, because of
the pleading requirements created in Bell ).
194

195

See supra 157–94 and accompanying text (applying the Casey test to Brown).

Brown, 248, P.3d at 1145 (stating the “confusion between what is required by the
constitution and statute for a notice of claim, and what must be alleged in a complaint, has
continued” since Bell ).
196
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misinterpreted by courts.197 For example, the WGCA also requires a claimant to
itemize damages in its complaint.198 In Excel Construction, Inc. v Town of Lovell,
the claimant alleged the Town of Lovell owed Excel $2,688,173.80, referencing
an itemized statement of damages as attached to the notice of claim.199 However,
the claimant inadvertently failed to attach the itemized statement.200 The claimant
tried to correct its mistake; however, the amended notice was not filed within the
two-year limitation.201 The district court relied on cases that were overruled by
Brown, holding that the court has made its position clear—litigants who bring
claims against the government must strictly comply with the requirements of the
WCGA202 and failure to comply prevents the district court from attaining subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim.203 This case is currently under advisement by
the Wyoming Supreme Court.204
Courts, however, are no longer faced with binding precedent that prevents
them from exercising their own discretion in such matters.205 Now, courts may
allow a claimant to amend its complaint in order to comply with the WGCA
and its pleading requirements.206 Further, in accordance with Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure, amendments curing a defective complaint will relate back to the
date the complaint was originally filed; therefore such amendments would not be
barred by the two-year statute of limitation.207

197

See infra notes 198–207 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(b) (2011) (“The claim shall state . . . [t]he amount of
compensation or other relief demanded.”).
198

Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, Excel Constr., Inc. v. Town of Lovell, No. S-11-001 (Wyo. Apr.
25, 2011), 2011 WL 2550881.
199

200

Id.

201

Id. at 6.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 7.

204

Id.

Brown v. City of Casper, 248 P.3d 1136, 1147–48 (Wyo. 2011) (overruling Bd. of Tr. of
Univ. of Wyo. v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 415 (Wyo. 1983)).
205

206

Id.

Wyo. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) (“An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading when . . . [t]he claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading.”);
Brown, 248 P.3d at 1147 (recognizing an amendment will relate back to the date the original claim
was filed).
207
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Conclusion
Before Bell, Wyoming law was clear that a claimant must provide a notice of
claim to the governmental entity in order to bring an action under the WGCA.208
However, failure to allege presentation of notice of claim in the complaint did
not deprive district courts of jurisdiction over a governmental claim.209 Brown
returned to this reasoning and corrected nearly thirty years of flawed precedent.210
Brown held that if a notice of claim was properly provided to the State and the
claimant simply failed to allege notice in the complaint, a claimant may amend
the complaint and pursue its constitutionally protected day in court.211 Thanks
to Brown, no longer will thousands of dollars be wasted, countless hours spent,
and cases be dismissed over mere technicalities rather than the actual merits
of the governmental claim.212 This change in law puts an end to attorneys and
judges taking advantage of a judicially created loophole.213 Now, when individuals
suffer injuries at the hand of the State, their claims will not be denied due to
simple technicalities.214

208
See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (discussing cases leading up to Bell that
required claimants to present a governmental entity with a notice of claim before initiating suit).
209
See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text (explaining cases before Bell did not require
a claimant to allege compliance with statutory requirements in order for district courts to gain
jurisdiction over WGCA claims).
210

See supra notes 105–34 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Brown).

211

See supra notes 105–34 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Brown).

See supra notes 48–77 and accompanying text (highlighting governmental claims that were
dismissed in reliance on Bell and its progeny).
212

213
See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kite’s disapproval of the
State’s display of dishonesty and covertness).
214
See supra notes 105–34 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Brown, which
allows claimants to amend their complaints instead of being dismissed due to mere technicalities).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2012

25

